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A Note On Boneh-Gentry-Waters Broadcast
Encryption Scheme and Its Like
Zhengjun Cao1, Lihua Liu2,∗
Abstract. Key establishment is any process whereby a shared secret key becomes
available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use such as symmetric-
key encryption. Though it is widely known that the primitive of encryption is different
from key establishment, we find some researchers have confused the two primitives. In
this note, we shall clarify the fundamental difference between the two primitives, and
point out that the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption scheme and its like are
key establishment schemes, not encryption schemes.
Keywords. key establishment; encryption; broadcast encryption
1 Introduction
Keeping information secret from all but those who are authorized to see it, is a main objective of
cryptography. The primitive of encryption can provide the functionality. Over the centuries, a lot
of mechanisms have been created to deal with the information security issue.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [3] introduced the concept of public-key cryptography and also
provided a new method for key establishment. But they had not put forth any public-key encryption
scheme at the time. In 1978, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [15] discovered the first practical
public-key encryption and signature scheme which is based on the hard mathematical problem of
factorization. To date, the computational performance of public-key encryption is inferior to that
of symmetric-key encryption because of much larger working parameters needed. So, public-key
encryption schemes are generally used to establish a key for a symmetric-key system being used by
communicating entities [14]. That is to say, key establishment is really intertwined with encryption.
Then, what is the fundamental difference between key establishment and encryption?
We find all literatures have not specified the difference. We also find some researchers have
confused key establishment and encryption. In this note, we shall clarify the difference between
the two primitives, and point out that the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption scheme [2]
and its like [1, 4, 8, 9, 11–13] are key establishment schemes, not encryption schemes.
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2 Key establishment
Definition 1 [14] Key establishment is any process whereby a shared secret key becomes available
to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.
Key establishment can be broadly subdivided into key agreement and key transport. A key
transport protocol is a key establishment technique where one party creates or otherwise obtains
a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s). A key agreement protocol is a key estab-
lishment technique in which a shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of
information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, such that no party can predetermine
the resulting value. Key establishment protocols result in shared secrets which are typically used
to derive, session keys. For example, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is such a protocol.
Table 1: Diffie-Hellman key agreement (basic version)
Setup A prime p and generator g of Z∗p are selected and published.
Protocol actions (a) A picks a random x, 1 ≤ x ≤ p− 2, and sends gx mod p to B.
(b) B picks a random y, 1 ≤ x ≤ p− 2, and sends gy mod p to A.
(c) B computes the shared key as K = (gx)y mod p.
(d) A computes the shared key as K = (gy)x mod p.
Result The shared secret K is known to both parties A and B.
3 Encryption
Definition 2 [14] Let A be a finite set called the alphabet of definition, M be a set called the
message space, C be a set called the ciphertext space, K be a set called the key space. Each element
e ∈ K uniquely determines a bijection from M to C, denoted by Ee. Ee is called an encryption
function or an encryption transformation. For each d ∈ K, Dd denotes a bijection from C to M.
Dd is called a decryption function or decryption transformation. An encryption scheme consists
of a set {Ee : e ∈ K} of encryption transformations and a corresponding set {Dd : d ∈ K} of
decryption transformations with the property that for each e ∈ K there is a unique key d ∈ K such
that Dd(Ee(m)) = m for all m ∈ M.
The above definition is somewhat tedious. We refer to RSA system for a concrete example of
encryption scheme, which is a well-known public-key encryption and signature scheme. Note that
at the end of the scheme, both the sender and the intended receiver know the message.
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Table 2: RSA encryption
Setup Pick two distinct odd primes p and q,
compute n = pq, φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1).
Pick e ∈ Z∗n, compute d = e
−1 mod φ(n)
Publish n, e and keep d, p, q in secret.
Encrypting For a message m ∈ Zn, compute c = m
e mod n.
Decrypting Use the secret key d to recover m = cd mod n.
4 A difference between key establishment and encryption
As we see, both Diffie-Hellman key agreement and RSA encryption can ensure the two participa-
tors to know a same thing, whether we call it a shared key or a message. Then, what are the
differences between key establishment and encryption? It is a pity that we find all literatures have
not specified the differences. We think the fundamental difference between two primitives is that
whether the resulting thing is pre-existing.
Concretely, in an encryption scheme, both two participators use the message as a whole. They do
not use any components of the message for the related transformations. But in a key establish-
ment scheme, at least one participator has to use some components of the shared key for related
computations and the final composition. To illustrate this point, we refer to the following Table 3
for the difference between RSA encryption and Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
Table 3: The difference between RSA encryption and Diffie-Hellman key agreement
RSA encryption Diffie-Hellman key agreement
Computation c = me mod n, gx mod p, gy mod p,
m = cd mod n. K = (gy)x mod p = (gx)y mod p.
Result Both the two parties know m. Both the two parties know K.
Characteristic m is pre-existing. K is not pre-existing.
5 The Boneh-Gentry-Waters “broadcast encryption” scheme and
its like are not true encryption schemes
5.1 The Boneh-Gentry-Waters “broadcast encryption” scheme
The primitive of broadcast encryption was formalized by Fiat and Naor [5], which requires that the
broadcaster encrypts a message such that a particular set of users can decrypt the message sent over
a broadcast channel. The Fiat-Naor broadcast encryption and the following works [6, 7, 10, 17, 18]
use a combinatorial approach. This approach has to right the balance between the efficiency and
the number of colluders that the system is resistant to. Recently, Boneh et al [2] have constructed
some “broadcast encrypt” systems. In these systems, the public parameters must be updated to
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allow more users. But we find the Boneh-Gentry-Waters “broadcast encryption” scheme and its
like [1, 4, 8, 9, 11–13] are not true encryption schemes. They are key establishment schemes. For
convenience, we now relate the Boneh-Gentry-Waters scheme as follows.
Setup(n): Suppose there are n users in the system. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p.
Pick a random generator g ∈ G and random numbers α, γ ∈ Zp. Compute v = g
γ and gi = g
(αi)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, n+ 2, · · · , 2n. The public key is set as:
PK = (g, g1, · · · , gn, gn+2, · · · , g2n, v).
The private key for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n} is set as: di = g
γ
i .
Encrypt(S,PK): Let S be the set of the intending receivers. Pick a random t ∈ Zp and set
K = e(gn+1, g)
t. The value e(gn+1, g) can be computed as e(gn, g1). Next, set
Hdr =

gt, (v ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)
t


and output the pair (Hdr, K).
Decrypt(S, i, di,Hdr, PK): Parse Hdr as (C0, C1) and compute
K = e(gi, C1)/e(di ·
∏
j∈S
j 6=i
gn+1−j+i, C0).
5.2 Analysis
It is easy to see that in the Boneh-Gentry-Waters scheme the shared thing K is not pre-existing.
It depends on the choice of the encrypter. Moreover, the encrypter has to use its secret component
t for other computations. Of course, the scheme can be transformed into a regular encryption
scheme. It only needs to set c = M · e(gn+1, g)
t for a given message M ∈ G in the Encryption
phase. To recover M , the user with di can compute
M = c · e(di ·
∏
j∈S
j 6=i
gn+1−j+i, C0)/e(gi, C1).
But we should remark that pairings including Weil pairing and Tate pairing are derived from elliptic
curves [16]. Both K,M are in the extension field Fqk where Fq is the base field of the elliptic curve
defined over. k is called the embedding degree which is the smallest positive integer such that p
divides (qk − 1). That means the scheme has to work in some extension of the base field, even
though the inputting parameters are defined over the base field. That is to say, the scheme has to
work in a running environment with parameters of 1024 bits, not 160 bits as supposed (someone
has confused the inputting-parameter’s size with the working-parameter’s size), so as to offer 80
bits security level. The shortcoming makes the scheme lose its competitive advantages significantly.
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6 Conclusion
We clarify the fundamental difference between encryption and key establishment. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first time to put forth such an explicit principle to discriminate the two prim-
itives. We also remark some schemes are not true encryption schemes, instead key establishment
schemes.
References
[1] N. Attrapadung, J. Furukawa, and H. Imai. Forward-secure and searchable broadcast encryp-
tion with short ciphertexts and private keys. In the proceeding of Asiacrypt 2006, LNCS, Vol.
4284, papes 161-177. Springer-Verlag (2006)
[2] D. Boneh, C. Gentry, and B. Waters. Collusion resistant broadcast encryption with short
ciphertexts and private keys. In the proceeding of Crypto 2005, LNCS, vol. 3494, pages 258-
275. Springer-Verlag (2005)
[3] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 22: 644C654, 1976.
[4] C. Delerable´e, P. Paillier, and D. Pointcheval. Fully collusion secure dynamic broadcast en-
cryption with constant-size ciphertexts or decryption keys. In the proceeding of Pairing 2007,
LNCS, vol. 4575, pages 39-59. Springer-Verlag (2007)
[5] A. Fiat and M. Naor. Broadcast encryption. In the proceeding of Crypto 1993, LNCS, vol.
773, pages 480-491. Springer-Verlag (1993)
[6] E. Gafni, J. Staddon, and Y.L. Yin. Efficient methods for integrating traceability and broadcast
encryption. In the proceeding of Crypto 1999, LNCS, vol. 1666, pages 372-387. Springer-Verlag
(1999)
[7] J. Garay, J. Staddon, and A. Wool. Long-lived broadcast encryption. In the proceeding of
Crypto 2000, LNCS, vol. 1880, pages 333-352. Springer-Verlag (2000)
[8] C. Gentry and B. Waters. Adaptive security in broadcast encryption systems. In the proceeding
of Eurocrypt 2009, LNCS, vol. 5479, pages 171-188. Springer-Verlag (2009)
[9] P. Junod and A. Karlov. An efficient public-key attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme
allowing arbitrary access policies. In the proceeding of DRM 2010, ACM Press (2010)
[10] R. Kumar, S. Rajagopalan, and A. Sahai. Coding constructions for blacklisting problems
without computational assumptions. In the proceeding of Crypto 1999, LNCS, vol. 1666, pages
609-623, Springer-Verlag (1999)
[11] K. Lee, et al. Self-updatable encryption: time constrained access control with hidden attributes
and better efficiency. In the proceeding of Asiacrypt 2013, LNCS, vol. 8269, page 235-254,
Springer-Verlag (2013)
[12] K. Lee. Self-updatable encryption with short public parameters and its extensions. Cryptology
ePrint Archive: Report 2014/231
[13] B. Malek and A. Miri. Adaptively secure broadcast encryption with short ciphertexts. Inter-
national Journal of Network Security, Vol.14, No.2, pages 71-79, 2012.
5
[14] A. Menezes, P. Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press,
1996.
[15] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-
key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21: 120C126, 1978.
[16] J. Silverman. The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves, Springer-Verlag, 1986.
[17] D. Stinson. On some methods for unconditionally secure key distribution and broadcast en-
cryption. Des. Codes Cryptography, 12(3), 215-243, 1997.
[18] D. Stinson and T. Trung. Some new results on key distribution patterns and broadcast en-
cryption. Des. Codes Cryptography, 14(3), 261-279, 1998.
6
